Employee Flight Risk and Capital Structure Decisions

Posted: 20 Dec 2018 Last revised: 30 Jan 2023

See all articles by Maryam Fathollahi

Maryam Fathollahi

University of Oklahoma- Division of Finance

Sandy Klasa

University of Arizona - Department of Finance

Hernan Ortiz-Molina

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business

Date Written: August 25, 2019

Abstract

I show that the risk of incurring large employee departure-related costs, unrelated to trade secret-related costs, impacts firms’ capital structure decisions. I proxy for these costs with the cross-industry labor mobility of a firm’s workers using a novel dynamic textual measure for this mobility based on network centrality. When firms face a higher risk of employee departures to firms in other industries, they maintain a lower debt ratio, hold more cash, and pay less dividends. The effect of cross-industry labor mobility on firms’ capital structure is stronger for firms with more workers who are skilled or in managerial occupations, firms in labor-intensive industries, firms with greater hiring costs, financially constrained firms, and when workers have lower switching costs. Conversely, the effect of cross-industry labor mobility on firms’ capital structure is weaker for firms in industries with higher relative performance and valuations. To infer causality, I make use of several different exogenous shocks to employee departure and job switching costs. Overall, my findings imply that firms choose more conservative financial policies when they face a greater risk of incurring large employee departure costs.

Keywords: capital structure, labor mobility, exogenous shock, skilled workers, textual analysis, network analysis

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G35, J24, J61, J62

Suggested Citation

Fathollahi, Maryam and Klasa, Sandy and Ortiz-Molina, Hernan, Employee Flight Risk and Capital Structure Decisions (August 25, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3294629 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3294629

Maryam Fathollahi (Contact Author)

University of Oklahoma- Division of Finance ( email )

Adams Hall
307 West Brooks
Norman, OK 73019-4004
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ou.edu/price/finance/faculty/maryam-fathollahi

Sandy Klasa

University of Arizona - Department of Finance ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-8761 (Phone)

Hernan Ortiz-Molina

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business ( email )

2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada
604-822-6095 (Phone)
604-822-4695 (Fax)

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