Inequality and Market Concentration, When Shareholding is More Skewed than Consumption

15 Pages Posted: 2 Jan 2019

See all articles by Joshua S. Gans

Joshua S. Gans

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER

Andrew Leigh

Australian House of Representatives Parliament House

Martin C. Schmalz

CEPR; University of Oxford - Finance; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Adam Triggs

Australian National University (ANU) - Crawford School of Public Policy

Date Written: December 14, 2018

Abstract

Economic theory suggests that monopoly prices hurt consumers but benefit shareholders. But in a world where individuals or households can be both consumers and shareholders, the impact of market power on inequality depends in part on the relative distribution of consumption and corporate equity ownership across individuals or households. The paper calculates this distribution for the United States, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Consumer Expenditure Survey, spanning nearly three decades from 1989 to 2016. In 2016, the top 20 percent consumed approximately as much as the bottom 60 percent, but had 13 times as much corporate equity. Because ownership is more skewed than consumption, increased mark-ups increase inequality. Moreover, over time, corporate equity has become even more skewed relative to consumption.

Keywords: monopoly, market power, inequality

JEL Classification: D42, D43, D61, D63

Suggested Citation

Gans, Joshua S. and Leigh, Andrew and Schmalz, Martin C. and Schmalz, Martin C. and Triggs, Adam, Inequality and Market Concentration, When Shareholding is More Skewed than Consumption (December 14, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3301263

Joshua S. Gans (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuagans.com

NBER ( email )

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Andrew Leigh

Australian House of Representatives Parliament House

Canberra, 2600
Australia

Martin C. Schmalz

University of Oxford - Finance ( email )

United States

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo ( email )

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Adam Triggs

Australian National University (ANU) - Crawford School of Public Policy

ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
J.G. Crawford Building, #132, Lennox Crossing
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

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