Wealth Conditions and Feasibility of Equivalence Between Funds Managers' and Investors' Risk Tolerances

63 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2019 Last revised: 11 Apr 2019

Date Written: April 9, 2019

Abstract

Whereas risk tolerance is an important parameter of financial intermediation in markets for mutual funds, formal theoretical predictions show funds managers' choices of portfolio risk tolerances can be induced in entirety by wealth considerations. An important implication of this finding is the prediction that funds' incentives for adoption of a generalist focus vary intertemporally (increase) with funds managers' equilibrium minimum wealth conditions. Within markets characterized as `Attrition Markets', resulting generalist funds are more likely to be value funds. Within markets characterized as `Indifference Markets', resulting generalist funds equally are likely to be either of value or growth funds. Formal theoretical predictions show choices of funds on basis of funds' risk tolerance alone engender transfers of wealth from investors to funds managers. These theoretically predicted transfers of wealth rationalize evidence for presence of systemic inefficiencies within markets for mutual funds. Choices of funds on basis of ability are shown to mitigate wealth transfers from investors to funds managers. Study findings provide a formal theoretical rationale for theoretical or empirical searches in quest of robust proxies for funds managers' intrinsic ability. In aggregate, formal predictions provide evidence that markets for mutual funds are indifference markets that subsume attrition markets within each specific cadre of risk tolerance.

Keywords: Mutual Funds, Risk Tolerance, Wealth, Ability, Diversification, Generalist

JEL Classification: G11, G24

Suggested Citation

Obrimah, Oghenovo A., Wealth Conditions and Feasibility of Equivalence Between Funds Managers' and Investors' Risk Tolerances (April 9, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3309973 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3309973

Oghenovo A. Obrimah (Contact Author)

FISK University ( email )

1000 17th Ave N
Nashville, TN TN 37208-3051
United States
4049404990 (Phone)

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