Information Nudges and Self-Control

65 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2019

See all articles by Thomas Mariotti

Thomas Mariotti

University of Toulouse I

Nikolaus Schweizer

Tilburg School of Economics and Management

Nora Szech

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Jonas von Wangenheim

University of Bonn - Department of Economics; Free University of Berlin (FUB)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.

Keywords: information design, information nudges, present-biased preferences, self-control

JEL Classification: C730, D820

Suggested Citation

Mariotti, Thomas and Schweizer, Nikolaus and Szech, Nora and von Wangenheim, Jonas, Information Nudges and Self-Control (2018). CESifo Working Paper No. 7346, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338673

Thomas Mariotti (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse I ( email )

Toulouse, 31000
France

Nikolaus Schweizer

Tilburg School of Economics and Management ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE Ti
Netherlands

Nora Szech

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology ( email )

Kaiserstra├če 12
Karlsruhe, Baden W├╝rttemberg 76131
Germany

Jonas Von Wangenheim

University of Bonn - Department of Economics ( email )

Bonn
Germany

Free University of Berlin (FUB) ( email )

Van't-Hoff-Str. 8
Berlin, Berlin 14195
Germany

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