Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations

57 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2019 Last revised: 7 May 2019

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2019

Abstract

In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997-2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals.

JEL Classification: D72, J45, O10

Suggested Citation

Colonnelli, Emanuele and Prem, Mounu and Teso, Edoardo, Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations (April 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13697. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379613

Emanuele Colonnelli (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://emanuelecolonnelli.com

Mounu Prem

Universidad del Rosario ( email )

Casa Pedro Fermín
Calle 14 # 4-69
Bogota
Colombia

Edoardo Teso

Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS) ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

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