Price Pressure Indices, Innovation and Mergers Between Commonly Owned Firms

22 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2019

See all articles by Roman Inderst

Roman Inderst

Goethe University Frankfurt

Stefan Thomas

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law

Date Written: July 24, 2019

Abstract

The potentially anticompetitive effects of common ownership are being discussed controversially. While the US agencies still display reluctance, the Commission has already invoked common ownership has part of a theory of harm in Dow/DuPont and Bayer/Monsanto. In our paper we focus on how common ownership can bear on the application of price pressure indices in unilateral effects analysis of horizontal mergers between portfolio companies. We do not assess whether the underlying premise of common ownership to lead to an internalization of shareholders’ expectations of high overall market returns is convincing. Rather, we hypothesize such common shareholder influence. Our main conclusion is that common ownership should still not be considered a general circumstantial factor indicating competitive harm with respect to post-merger price increases or effects on innovation competition. Rather, it calls for case-by-case analysis.

Suggested Citation

Inderst, Roman and Thomas, Stefan, Price Pressure Indices, Innovation and Mergers Between Commonly Owned Firms (July 24, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3426336 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3426336

Roman Inderst

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, Hessen 60629
Germany
+49 (69) 798-34601 (Phone)
+49 (69) 798-35000 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/en/departments/finance/lehrstuhl/prof-dr-roman-inderst/team

Stefan Thomas (Contact Author)

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law ( email )

Geschwister Scholl Platz
Tuebingen, 72074
Germany
0049-7071-29-72556 (Phone)
0049-7071-29-2105 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/professoren_und_dozenten/thomas

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