Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations

Posted: 4 Sep 2019

Date Written: August 2019


Market design applies economic principles to the often messy problems of real-world exchange in which goods may not be homogeneous, the identities of trading partners may matter, contracts may not be executed, and even the formulation of trade as balancing supply and demand may be unhelpful. This article recounts the mostly academic research advancing the analysis and design of such markets. Among the highlighted applications are ones involving financial markets, Internet advertising, electricity auctions, spectrum auctions, cryptocurrencies, and combinatorial procurements.

Suggested Citation

Milgrom, Paul R., Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations (August 2019). Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 383-405, 2019. Available at SSRN: or

Paul R. Milgrom (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Landau Economics Building
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Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
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