Do Employees Matter for Firms’ Tax Planning Decisions? Evidence from Labor Mobility

45 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2019

See all articles by Lars Helge Haß

Lars Helge Haß

University of Strathclyde - Strathclyde Business School; Lancaster University - Lancaster University Management School

Thomas C. Omer

University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy

Skrålan Vergauwe

KU Leuven

Date Written: September 16, 2019

Abstract

We examine the impact of employee incentives on firms’ tax planning. Labor mobility refers to the flexibility of workers to find alternative employment. Higher labor mobility increases expected labor adjustment costs for firms and increases employees’ bargaining power. Therefore, firms have strong incentives to make decisions in line with employees’ preferences when labor mobility is high. Using a sample of U.S. firms from 1993-2015, we find evidence that higher labor mobility is positively associated with cash effective tax rates and negatively associated with the volatility of cash effective tax rates. Results imply that firms engage in less tax avoidance when labor mobility is higher. We find stronger results for less unionized industries and environments with lower employment security. We provide evidence of a causal effect of labor mobility on tax planning by exploiting changes in state real estate transfer taxes.

Keywords: employees, labor mobility, tax planning, tax avoidance

JEL Classification: J60, H20, H26

Suggested Citation

Haß, Lars Helge and Omer, Thomas C. and Vergauwe, Skrålan, Do Employees Matter for Firms’ Tax Planning Decisions? Evidence from Labor Mobility (September 16, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455973 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3455973

Lars Helge Haß (Contact Author)

University of Strathclyde - Strathclyde Business School ( email )

United Kingdom

Lancaster University - Lancaster University Management School ( email )

United Kingdom

Thomas C. Omer

University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy ( email )

307 College of Business Administration
Lincoln, NE 68588-0488
United States

Skrålan Vergauwe

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

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