Coupons, Competition, and Complexity: Security Design under Low Interest Rates

98 Pages Posted: 30 Dec 2019 Last revised: 14 Nov 2023

See all articles by Marc Chesney

Marc Chesney

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance

Felix Fattinger

WU Vienna University of Economics and Business

Nils Jonathan Krakow

University of Zurich - Department of Finance

Simon Straumann

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Date Written: October 27, 2023

Abstract

We study the market for retail investment products in times of low interest rates. Combining experimental and field data, we show that decreasing interest rates drive investment demand but fail to rationalize the empirically observed increase in product complexity. In contrast, we provide evidence that banks strategically increase complexity to mitigate price competition. Because complex products bear higher down-side risk and are first-order dominated by simpler products, this strategic use of complexity results in higher uncompensated risk-taking by investors. Overall, our findings showcase how low interest rates can indirectly fuel excessive risk-taking.

Keywords: Financial innovation; reaching-for-yield; complexity; competition; risk-taking; dependency perception; overconfidence

JEL Classification: G4, D14, E44, G13, G18

Suggested Citation

Chesney, Marc and Fattinger, Felix and Krakow, Nils Jonathan and Straumann, Simon, Coupons, Competition, and Complexity: Security Design under Low Interest Rates (October 27, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3499660

Marc Chesney

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.bf.uzh.ch/en/persons/chesney-marc

Felix Fattinger (Contact Author)

WU Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1, Building D1, 3rd Floor
Vienna, 1020
Austria

Nils Jonathan Krakow

University of Zurich - Department of Finance ( email )

Plattenstr 32
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

Simon Straumann

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

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