Did India’s Price Control Policy for Coronary Stents Create Unintended Consequences?

Abstract

In February 2017, India capped the retail price of coronary stents and restricted the channel margin to bring Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) procedure, which uses coronary stents, within reach of millions of patients who previously could not afford it. Prior research shows that care providers respond to such regulations in a way that compensates for their loss in profits because of price control. Therefore, price control policies often introduce unintended consequences, such as distortions in clinical decision making. We investigate such distortions through empirical analysis of claims data from a representative public insurance program in the Indian state of Karnataka. Our data comprises 25,769 insurance claims from 69 private and seven public hospitals from February 2016 to February 2018. The public insurance context is ideal for investigating distortions in clinical decisions as the price paid by patients, and thereby access to the treatment, does not change after price control. We find that the change in the average volume of PTCA procedures per hospital per month after price control disproportionately increased when compared to the change in the clinical alternative – Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) procedures. This increase corresponds to 6% of the average number of PTCA procedures and 28% of the average number of CABG procedures before the price control. In addition, disproportionate increase in PTCA procedures occurred only among private hospitals, indicating the possibility of profit-maximization intentions driving the clinical choices. Such clinical distortions can have negative implications for patient health outcomes in the long run. We discuss alternative policies to improve access and affordability to healthcare products and services which are likely to not suffer from similar distortions.

Keywords: Health policy, Global health, India, Coronary stents, Price control