State of New York v. Deutsche Telecom AG. Brief of Amici Curiae Nicholas Economides, John Kwoka, Thomas Philippon, Robert Seamans, Hal Singer, Marshall Steinbaum, and Lawrence J. White in Support of Plaintiffs

20 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2020

See all articles by Nicholas Economides

Nicholas Economides

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

John E. Kwoka, Jr.

Northeastern University - Department of Economics

Thomas Philippon

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert Seamans

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Hal J. Singer

Econ One

Marshall Steinbaum

University of Utah Department of Economics

Lawrence J. White

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Date Written: January 13, 2020

Abstract

As economists with significant experience in competition, telecommunications, and regulatory matters, we have filed the attached brief in the case of State of New York v. Deutsche Telecom supporting the plaintiffs, who have sued to prevent the merger of T-Mobile and Sprint. We explain why the proposed merger of Sprint and T-Mobile and the elimination of Sprint as a competitor, even in the presence of the U.S. Department of Justice's proposed remedy (as embodied in the DOJ's Proposed Final Judgment), would predictably inflict serious antitrust injury on consumers and competition.

Keywords: antitrust, telecommunications, merger, Sprint, T-Mobile, AT&T, Verizon, Dish, DOJ

JEL Classification: L1, L4, L5, L9

Suggested Citation

Economides, Nicholas and Kwoka, John E. and Philippon, Thomas and Seamans, Robert and Singer, Hal J. and Steinbaum, Marshall and White, Lawrence J., State of New York v. Deutsche Telecom AG. Brief of Amici Curiae Nicholas Economides, John Kwoka, Thomas Philippon, Robert Seamans, Hal Singer, Marshall Steinbaum, and Lawrence J. White in Support of Plaintiffs (January 13, 2020). NET Institute Working Paper No. #20-01; NYU Stern School of Business. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3519363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3519363

Nicholas Economides (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0864 (Phone)
212-995-4218 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/

John E. Kwoka

Northeastern University - Department of Economics ( email )

301 Lake Hall
Boston, MA 02115
(617) 373-2882 (Phone)
(617) 373-3640 (Fax)

Thomas Philippon

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Robert Seamans

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Hal J. Singer

Econ One ( email )

805 15th Street
Suite 501
Washington, DC 20005
United States
202.312.3065 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.econone.com/staff-member/hal-singer/

Marshall Steinbaum

University of Utah Department of Economics ( email )

1645 Central Campus Dr.
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://faculty.utah.edu/u6024209-Marshall_Steinbaum/hm/index.hml

Lawrence J. White

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

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