Mergers Under the Microscope: Analysing Conference Call Transcripts

75 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2020 Last revised: 3 Jun 2024

See all articles by Sudipto Dasgupta

Sudipto Dasgupta

Chinese University of Hong Kong, ABFER, CEPR, and ECGI

Jarrad Harford

University of Washington; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Fangyuan Ma

Peking University HSBC Business School

Daisy Wang

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance

Haojun Xie

the Chinese University of Hong Kong

Date Written: January 30, 2020

Abstract

M&A conference calls held shortly after deal announcement are associated with positive market reactions, higher deal completion rates, and reduced information asymmetry, consistent with selective disclosure. However, the impact disappears when the call decision is instrumented, i.e., when the decision is presumably uncorrelated with the underlying deal value. Analysis of call content shows that managers can control the informativeness of conference calls by emphasizing different types of topics, such as soft versus hard information topics. Our findings highlight the selective transparency of M&A call disclosures, shedding light on the information environment that investors navigate when assessing merger values.

Keywords: Mergers; Acquisitions; Conference Call; Machine Learning; Probabilistic Topic Modelling

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Dasgupta, Sudipto and Harford, Jarrad and Ma, Fangyuan and Wang, Daisy and Xie, Haojun, Mergers Under the Microscope: Analysing Conference Call Transcripts (January 30, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3528016 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3528016

Sudipto Dasgupta

Chinese University of Hong Kong, ABFER, CEPR, and ECGI ( email )

CUHK, Cheng Yu Tung Building, Room 1224
Shatin, NT
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Jarrad Harford

University of Washington ( email )

Box 353226
Seattle, WA 98195-3226
United States
206-543-4796 (Phone)
206-543-7472 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.washington.edu/jarrad/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Fangyuan Ma (Contact Author)

Peking University HSBC Business School ( email )

Rm 705, PHBS, University Town, Nanshan
Shenzhen, Guangdong 518055
China

Daisy Wang

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

Haojun Xie

the Chinese University of Hong Kong ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
864
Abstract Views
3,584
Rank
54,711
PlumX Metrics