Financing Democracy

56 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2003

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Research; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Verena Liessem

Heidelberg University - Faculty of Economics and Social Studies

Date Written: December 2002

Abstract

Based on contribution patterns to parties in Germany and elsewhere, we suggest that European democracies should use a mixed system where private funding can play a larger role than public funding. In Germany the high level of public funding for parties can be reduced without expecting undesirable effects if the parties are forced to increase private funding. Private contributions can be unlimited but tight transparency requirements on private funding are necessary. This can be achieved by setting up an independent commission with institutionalized publication rules. Tax deductibility of private contributions should be eliminated.

Keywords: Campaigns, Funding of Parties, Democracies, Transparency Requirements, Private Contributions

JEL Classification: D7, D83, H11

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans and Liessem, Verena, Financing Democracy (December 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=355041 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.355041

Hans Gersbach (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Research ( email )

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Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Verena Liessem

Heidelberg University - Faculty of Economics and Social Studies ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany
+49-6221-543172 (Phone)
+49-6221-543578 (Fax)

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