Download This PaperCan a Better Informed Listener be Easier to Persuade?
24 Pages Posted: 5 May 2020 Last revised: 20 Aug 2020
Date Written: April 10, 2020
Abstract
We study the impact of exogenous news on the classic Bayesian persuasion problem. The sender supplies information over multiple periods, but is unable to commit at the onset to the information that she will supply in periods ahead. A tension then emerges between the sender and her future self. We show that by resolving this tension, more informative news can make the sender better off.
Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Dynamic Games, Information Provision
JEL Classification: C70, D72, D80
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bizzotto, Jacopo and Vigier, Adrien, Can a Better Informed Listener be Easier to Persuade? (April 10, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572608 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3572608
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