Can a Better Informed Listener be Easier to Persuade?

24 Pages Posted: 5 May 2020 Last revised: 20 Aug 2020

See all articles by Jacopo Bizzotto

Jacopo Bizzotto

Oslo Business School - OsloMet

Adrien Vigier

University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 10, 2020

Abstract

We study the impact of exogenous news on the classic Bayesian persuasion problem. The sender supplies information over multiple periods, but is unable to commit at the onset to the information that she will supply in periods ahead. A tension then emerges between the sender and her future self. We show that by resolving this tension, more informative news can make the sender better off.

Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Dynamic Games, Information Provision

JEL Classification: C70, D72, D80

Suggested Citation

Bizzotto, Jacopo and Vigier, Adrien, Can a Better Informed Listener be Easier to Persuade? (April 10, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572608 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3572608

Jacopo Bizzotto (Contact Author)

Oslo Business School - OsloMet ( email )

Pilestredet 35
Oslo, 0166
Norway

Adrien Vigier

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

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