Pilestredet 35
Oslo, 0166
Norway
Oslo Business School - OsloMet
Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Dynamic Information Provision
Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Dynamic Games
Information Acquisition; Testing; Disclosure; Certification
Credit Rating Agencies, Information Acquisition, Reputation
Education, Moral Hazard, Grading, Peer Effects, Stratification
Information Design, Moral Hazard, Agency Cost, Information Acquisition
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Agency Cost, Information Acquisition, information design, moral hazard
Certification, delegation, entry of firms, investments in quality, private politics
Auditing, corruption, information design, regulation
commitment, Stackelberg, Cournot, information design
Bayesian Persuasion, Dynamic Games, Information Provision
Electoral competition, multidimensional policy space, microtargeting, office-motivated candidates, negative campaigning, strategic disclosure
market segmentation, price discrimination, auction
Bribery, Collusion, Corruption, Regulation, Auditing
Brexit, interest groups, forecaster behaviour, voting
commitment, robustness, Sequential Games, Stackelberg competition
