On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms

Abstract

We study the design of optimal mechanisms when the designer is uncertain both about the form of information held by the agents and also about which equilibrium will be played. The guarantee of a mechanism is its worst performance across all information structures and equilibria. The potential of an information structure is its best performance across all mechanisms and equilibria. We formulate a pair of linear programs, one of which is a lower bound on the maximum guarantee across all mechanisms, and the other of which is an upper bound the minimum potential across all information structures. In applications to public expenditure, bilateral trade, and optimal auctions, we use the bounding programs to characterize guarantee-maximizing mechanisms and potential-minimizing information structures and show that the max guarantee is equal to the min potential.

Keywords: Mechanism design, information design, public expenditure, optimal auctions, max-min, Bayes correlated equilibrium, robustness JEL Classification: C72, D44, D82, D83

JEL Classification: C72, D44, D82, D83