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University of Chicago - Department of Economics
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Information, beliefs, signals, Blackwell order, network
Mechanism design, information design, optimal auctions, profit maximization, common value, information structure, maxmin, Bayes correlated equilibrium, direct mechanism
Mechanism design, information design, optimal auctions, profit maximiza- tion, common value, information structure, maxmin, Bayes correlated equilibrium, direct mechanism
Matrix games, linear programming, equivalence
Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, "Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, \Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
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Law of One Price, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Bertrand Competition, information structure, price competition, Price Count, Price Quote, search
Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
stochastic game, perfect monitoring, algorithm, computation
Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Reserve price, Revenue equivalence
Mechanism design, information design, public expenditure, optimal auctions, max-min, Bayes correlated equilibrium, robustness JEL Classification: C72, D44, D82, D83
Mechanism design, information design, public good, interdependent values, robustness
Mechanism design, information design, dual reduction, max-min, Bayes correlated equilibrium, robustness
Mechanism design, rational expectations, private information, common value, private value, full surplus extraction, large market, robustness
beliefs, Blackwell order, Information, networks, signals
