Life Cycles of Firm Disclosures

65 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2020 Last revised: 1 Nov 2021

See all articles by AJ Chen

AJ Chen

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Gerard Hoberg

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department

Vojislav Maksimovic

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

Date Written: October 30, 2021

Abstract

We examine the link between product life cycles and disclosure using a novel 4-stage text-based life cycle model and report two main results. First, the standard link between competition and less disclosure holds primarily in the early product development life cycle stage, when product strategies are not fully public. Second, firms with mature-stage products disclose more, consistent with lowering search costs for an outward-focused investment strategy seeking synergistic partners. These results obtain across a wide array of disclosure policies and in a quasi natural experiment. Our interpretations are further supported by tests examining not only the sender of disclosure, but also the intended receiver.

Keywords: Disclosures, Life-Cycle, Investment, Competition, Patents, Redaction, EDGAR Search

JEL Classification: D83, E22, G34, L15, M41

Suggested Citation

Chen, AJ and Hoberg, Gerard and Maksimovic, Vojislav, Life Cycles of Firm Disclosures (October 30, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3703931 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3703931

AJ Chen (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

Los Angeles, CA
United States

Gerard Hoberg

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )

Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.marshall.usc.edu/Gerard-Hoberg/

Vojislav Maksimovic

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )

Van Munching Hall
College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States
301-405-2125 (Phone)
301-314-9157 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/vmax/home

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,169
Abstract Views
4,118
rank
24,964
PlumX Metrics