What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room: R v Mirza, the Criminal Justice and Courts Act, and the Problem of Racial Bias

Abstract

This Article argues that courts’ refusal to consider juror testimony about deliberations and the laws restricting jurors from speaking about deliberations prevent defendants from seeking adequate redress for juror racial bias. The Article first presents a brief history of the common law and statutory foundations of jury secrecy under English law. I then argue that juror racial bias uniquely threatens the right to an impartial tribunal and that other safeguards are not necessarily adequate to ameliorate or prevent bias during deliberations. English courts have historically upheld jury secrecy by holding that the interests of finality and candour outweigh the injury done to a defendant by juror racial bias, as exemplified in R v Mirza. While the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 does make some changes to jury secrecy law — mainly by allowing jurors to report some forms of misconduct that occur during deliberations — this Article argues that the Act inadequately protects defendants. The Act’s reporting provisions are overly complex, largely non-adversarial, and too focused on enabling the prosecution of jurors who commit misconduct. I argue that a reform of this Act to more explicitly focus on protecting defendants from juror misconduct — and in particular, juror racial bias — is necessary to better secure defendants' fair trial rights.

Keywords: law of juries, criminal procedure, racial bias and the law, jury secrecy, fair trial rights