Knowing the Informed Player's Payoffs and Simple Play in Repeated Games

15 Pages Posted: 5 May 2021 Last revised: 28 May 2021

See all articles by Takuma Habu

Takuma Habu

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Elliot Lipnowski

Columbia University

Doron Ravid

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 27, 2021

Abstract

We revisit the classic model of two-player repeated games with undiscounted utility, observable actions, and one-sided incomplete information, and further assume the informed player has state-independent preferences. We show the informed player can attain a payoff in equilibrium if and only if she can attain it in the simple class of equilibria first studied by Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1968), in which information is only revealed in the game's initial stages. This sufficiency result does not extend to the uninformed player's equilibrium payoff set.

Keywords: undiscounted repeated games, strategic communication

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83

Suggested Citation

Habu, Takuma and Lipnowski, Elliot and Ravid, Doron, Knowing the Informed Player's Payoffs and Simple Play in Repeated Games (April 27, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3837519

Takuma Habu

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States

HOME PAGE: http://takumahabu.com

Elliot Lipnowski

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Doron Ravid (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 E. 59th St
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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