How Much Discretion Do, and Should, Competition Authorities Enjoy in the Course of Their Enforcement Activities? a Multi-Jurisdictional Assessment

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to assess whether competition agencies (“CAs”) do, and in turn should, enjoy an unfettered discretionary power in the context of the investigation of competition law infringements or whether their margin of discretion should be subject to certain limits. To this end, it focuses on four successive areas where CAs may be entitled to make choices, i.e. detection of infringements, selection of enforcement targets, initiation of infringement proceedings and outcome of the case. Thanks to reports received from 21 national experts in response to a questionnaire covering 18 jurisdictions, the present study formulates a number of public policy proposals.

Keywords: European Union, Procedures, Investigations, Competence, Institutions, Compliance

JEL Classification: K21