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Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications


James Albrecht


Georgetown University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Pieter A. Gautier


Free University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Susan Vroman


Georgetown University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

February 2003

IZA Discussion Paper No. 719

Abstract:     
We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Job Search, Directed Search, Matching

JEL Classification: J64, D83, J41


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Date posted: March 13, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Albrecht, James and Gautier, Pieter A. and Vroman, Susan, Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications (February 2003). IZA Discussion Paper No. 719. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=385182

Contact Information

James W. Albrecht (Contact Author)
Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-6105 (Phone)
202-687-6102 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

IZA Institute of Labor Economics
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Pieter A. Gautier
Free University of Amsterdam ( email )
Amsterdam, ND North Holland
Netherlands
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Susan B. Vroman
Georgetown University ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-6024 (Phone)
202-687-6102 (Fax)
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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