Persuasion with Multiple Actions

28 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2021 Last revised: 28 Sep 2022

See all articles by Davit Khantadze

Davit Khantadze

ISET at Tbilisi State University

Ilan Kremer

University of Warwick; Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Andrzej Skrzypacz

Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: June 29, 2021

Abstract

We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple receivers take multiple actions. We compare simultaneous procedures to sequential ones. In a simultaneous procedure, all the receivers act simultaneously following the realization of a single public signal. In a sequential procedure, receivers receive information and take actions sequentially. We characterize the conditions under which the optimal sequential procedure leads to a higher payoff and characterize the optimal ordering of actions.

Keywords: Dynamic Persuasion, Information Disclosure

JEL Classification: D21

Suggested Citation

Khantadze, Davit and Kremer, Ilan and Kremer, Ilan and Skrzypacz, Andrzej, Persuasion with Multiple Actions (June 29, 2021). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3875925 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875925

Davit Khantadze

ISET at Tbilisi State University ( email )

16 Zandukeli Street
Tbilisi, 0108
Georgia

Ilan Kremer

University of Warwick ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

20 Lila Street
Re'ut
Jerusalem
Israel

Andrzej Skrzypacz (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-736-0987 (Phone)
650-725-9932 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
466
Abstract Views
5,260
Rank
124,025
PlumX Metrics