Protestant Interpretation, Conventions, and Legal Truth

Abstract

Gerald Postema has made influential contributions to many parts of legal philosophy (as well as moral philosophy, political philosophy, and the history of philosophy). This article focuses on the intersection of just two of those points of influence -- his critique of Ronald Dworkin’s work and with his equally important discussion of the role of conventions at the foundation of legal practice and legal theory – to consider some implications for the difficult question of truth in law.

Postema’s work, supplemented by the works of other scholars along similar lines, directs us towards important interlocking insights regarding the nature of law and the nature of legal truth. The emphasis on the shared, social, and institutional nature of law both raises and helps us to begin to respond to issues about how to understand what makes propositions about law true or false. In the article, Part I introduces Dworkin’s ‘Protestant approach’ and the critique it evoked from Postema (supplemented by points raised by Robert Cover and Sanford Levinson).
Part II looks at Postema’s discussions about the conventional groundings of law, and explores how this offers both answers and further questions regarding the nature of legal truth.

Keywords: Gerald Postema, Ronald Dworkin, Sanford Levinson, legal truth, "protestant" and "catholic" interpetation