Efficiency and Distributional Effects of Illinois Gas Taxes

5 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2021

See all articles by Don Fullerton

Don Fullerton

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Kaveh Nafari

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Julian Reif

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Date Written: March 23, 2015

Abstract

The current fiscal crisis in Illinois affects all parts of the state’s budget. Infrastructure is no exception. For many years Illinois has spent more on highways than it has collected in highway-related revenue. One solution to this problem is to increase the state’s gasoline tax. This report discusses the efficiency and distributional effects of increasing the state’s gas tax, and also compares a gas tax increase to alternative solutions such as increased use of tolls.

The gasoline tax might efficiently reduce gasoline use and associated negative externalities such as pollution, but a tax on “vehicle miles traveled” (VMT) might be more efficient at reducing other negative effects of driving like congestion and accidents. Another alternative is increased use of tolls. If these tolls are set at higher rates during rush hour, they can be most effective at reducing the worst congestion. All of these alternative policies might have regressive distributional burdens, since low-income families spend a higher fraction of income on driving than do high-income families, but these “road user taxes” might be justified as a way to charge those who benefit from the use of roads in Illinois.

Keywords: tax, gas, effects, tolls, index, policy, fiscal, gasoline, distributional, alternative, driving, programs

Suggested Citation

Fullerton, Don and Nafari, Kaveh and Reif, Julian, Efficiency and Distributional Effects of Illinois Gas Taxes (March 23, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3893636 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3893636

Don Fullerton (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
(217) 244-3621 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
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Kaveh Nafari

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

601 E John St
Champaign, IL Champaign 61820
United States

Julian Reif

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

601 E John St
Champaign, IL Champaign 61820
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.julianreif.com

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