International Unions

38 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2003

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ignazio Angeloni

Italian Finance Ministry - International Financial Relations

Federico Etro

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Ministry of Economy, Italy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods or policies that generate spillovers across members. The trade-off between benefits of coordination and loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the union's size, may block enlargement processes and induce excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with non-uniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies focusing on arrangements relevant in the context of existing unions or federal states, like enhanced cooperation, subsidiarity, federal mandates and earmarked grants.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Angeloni, Ignazio and Etro, Federico, International Unions (April 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=392440 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.392440

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Ignazio Angeloni

Italian Finance Ministry - International Financial Relations ( email )

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Federico Etro

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Italy