Determinants and Career Consequences of Early Audit Partner Rotations

57 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2021 Last revised: 15 Feb 2024

See all articles by Brandon Gipper

Brandon Gipper

Stanford University Graduate School of Business

Luzi Hail

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Christian Leuz

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Leibniz Institute SAFE; CESifo Research Network; Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

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Date Written: January 22, 2024

Abstract

We analyze a sample of 3,973 within-audit firm partner rotations for Big 6 issuer clients from 2008 to 2014 and find that partner rotations occurring early—before the end of the maximum five-year term—are associated with major audit quality issues such as financial restatements or PCAOB inspection findings. This link to audit quality is present only for early rotations that are not explained by retirements, promotions, or temporary leaves, and for large clients and less experienced partners. Female partners are more likely to be rotated for audit quality reasons. New incoming partners are more senior and have more time for the engagement. Early rotations have career consequences. Exiting partners are assigned to fewer, less risky SEC issuer clients, manage fewer audit hours, and receive lower partner ratings. Our results suggest that early partner rotations serve an important role for quality control within audit firms.

Keywords: auditor rotation, audit quality, audit partners, career development, audit industry, PCAOB

JEL Classification: J01, J44, L84, M21, M49

Suggested Citation

Gipper, Brandon and Hail, Luzi and Leuz, Christian, Determinants and Career Consequences of Early Audit Partner Rotations (January 22, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3934660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3934660

Brandon Gipper (Contact Author)

Stanford University Graduate School of Business ( email )

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Luzi Hail

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

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Christian Leuz

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