State-Evading Solutions to Violence: Organized Crime and Governance in Indigenous Mexico

81 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2022

See all articles by Beatriz Magaloni

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science

Kristóf Gosztonyi

Universität Osnabrück

Sarah Thompson

Stanford University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: January 12, 2022

Abstract

The monopoly of violence in the hands of the state is conceived as the principal vehicle to generate order. A problem with this vision is that parts of the state and its law enforcement apparatus often become extensions of criminality rather than solutions to it. We argue that one solution to this dilemma is to "opt out from the state." Using a multi-method strategy combining extensive qualitative research, quasi-experimental statistical analyses, and survey data, the paper demonstrates that indigenous communities in Mexico are better able to escape predatory criminal rule when they are legally allowed to carve a space of autonomy from the state through the institution of "usos y costumbres." We demonstrate that these municipalities are more immune to violence than similar localities where regular police forces and local judiciaries are in charge of law enforcement and where mayors are elected through multiparty elections rather than customary practices.

Keywords: Conflict, indigenous autonomy, violence, crime, state building, Latin America

Suggested Citation

Magaloni, Beatriz and Gosztonyi, Kristóf and Thompson, Sarah, State-Evading Solutions to Violence: Organized Crime and Governance in Indigenous Mexico (January 12, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4007565 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4007565

Beatriz Magaloni (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-7481 (Phone)

Kristóf Gosztonyi

Universität Osnabrück ( email )

Neuer Graben
Osnabrück, 49074
Germany

Sarah Thompson

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sarahthompson.info

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
397
Abstract Views
2,605
Rank
140,884
PlumX Metrics