The Big Short (Interest): Closing the Loopholes in the Dividend-Withholding Tax

66 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2022 Last revised: 16 Aug 2023

See all articles by Elisa Casi

Elisa Casi

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science

Evelina Gavrilova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science

David Murphy

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Floris Zoutman

NHH Norwegian School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 15, 2023

Abstract

We study the effect of stricter enforcement of the dividend-withholding tax (DWT). We focus on a 2016 Danish enforcement reform and compare Denmark to its Nordic neighbors. Throughout Nordic stock markets, shares on loan spike sharply around dividend dates. These spikes are consistent with so-called cum-cum and cum-ex trading. Post reform, spikes in Denmark disappear, and annual DWT revenue increases by 130 percent. Enforcement does not harm the investment climate, as measured by Danish stock returns, investment rate, and dividend yield.

Keywords: Tax Enforcement, Security Lending, Dividend Tax, Economic Effects

JEL Classification: K22, H26, G18, F23, M21

Suggested Citation

Casi-Eberhard, Elisa and Gavrilova, Evelina and Murphy, David and Zoutman, Floris, The Big Short (Interest): Closing the Loopholes in the Dividend-Withholding Tax (August 15, 2023). TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 76, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4039744 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4039744

Elisa Casi-Eberhard (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Bergen, 5045
Norway

Evelina Gavrilova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, 5045
Norway
4741152047 (Phone)

David Murphy

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Floris Zoutman

NHH Norwegian School of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
444
Abstract Views
1,844
Rank
89,481
PlumX Metrics