The Big Short (Interest): Closing the Loopholes in the Dividend-Withholding Tax

57 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2022

See all articles by Elisa Casi

Elisa Casi

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science

Evelina Gavrilova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science

David Joseph Murphy

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Business and Management Science

Floris Zoutman

NHH Norwegian School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

We study the effect of stricter enforcement of the dividend-withholding tax (DWT). We focus on a 2016 Danish reform and compare Denmark to its Nordic neighbors. Firms in all countries exhibit strong spikes in stocks on loan around dividend dates. These spikes comprise several percent of the public float. The spikes are consistent with the most popular DWT arbitrage transactions. Postreform, spikes in Denmark disappear. Stricter enforcement results in an approximately 130 percent increase in annual DWT revenue. Stricter enforcement does not negatively affect the investment climate as measured through Danish stock returns, investment and dividend yield. Studying other European reforms, we find that the 2016-reform in Germany was similarly able to eliminate spikes in security lending.

Keywords: dividend tax arbitrage, tax enforcement, financial innovation, welfare analysis

JEL Classification: H250, H260, O160, F380

Suggested Citation

Casi-Eberhard, Elisa and Gavrilova, Evelina and Murphy, David Joseph and Zoutman, Floris, The Big Short (Interest): Closing the Loopholes in the Dividend-Withholding Tax (2022). CESifo Working Paper No. 9594, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4043318 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4043318

Elisa Casi-Eberhard (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Bergen, 5045
Norway

Evelina Gavrilova

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, 5045
Norway
4741152047 (Phone)

David Joseph Murphy

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.nhh.no/en/employees/faculty/david-joseph-murphy/

Floris Zoutman

NHH Norwegian School of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

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