Least Squares Learning? Evidence from the Laboratory

67 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2022

See all articles by Te Bao

Te Bao

Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics

Yun Dai

Lingnan College, Sun Yat-Sen University

John Duffy

University of California, Irvine

Date Written: August 16, 2022

Abstract

We report on an experiment testing the empirical relevance of least squares (LS) learning, a common way of modelling how individuals learn a rational expectations equilibrium (REE). Subjects are endowed with the correct perceived law of motion (PLM) for a price level variable they are seeking to forecast, but do not know the true parameterization of that PLM. Instead, they must choose and can adjust the parameters of this PLM over 50 periods. Consistent with the E-stability of the REE in the model studied, 93.1% of subjects achieve convergence to the REE in terms of their price level predictions. However, only 20.3% of subjects can be characterized as least squares learners via the adjustments they make to the parameterization of the PLM over time. We also find that subjects' parameter estimates are more accurate when there is greater variance in the independent variable of the model. We consider several alternatives to least squares learning and find evidence that many subjects employ a simple satisficing approach.

Keywords: Rational Expectations Equilibrium, Least Squares Learning, Experimental Economics, Learning-to-Forecast Experiment, Behavioral Macroeconomics.

JEL Classification: C53, C91, D83, D84

Suggested Citation

Bao, Te and Dai, Yun and Duffy, John, Least Squares Learning? Evidence from the Laboratory (August 16, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4192049 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4192049

Te Bao

Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics ( email )

HSS 04-53, 14 Nanyang Drive
Singapore, 639798
Singapore

Yun Dai

Lingnan College, Sun Yat-Sen University ( email )

Guangzhou
China

John Duffy (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Department of Economics
3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697
United States
949-824-8341 (Phone)

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