Affective Polarization and Election Expectations

18 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2022

See all articles by Maxim Doiron

Maxim Doiron

Princeton University

Kaj Thomsson

Maastricht University - Department of Economics

Elias Tsakas

Maastricht University - Department of Economics

Alexander Vostroknutov

Maastricht University

Date Written: September 13, 2022

Abstract

The rise in polarization in American politics over recent decades has attracted plenty of interest both in academia and in the broader public discussion. However, the connection between affective polarization and individuals’ election expectations is virtually unexplored and poorly understood. Exploring this connection is critical to our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of rising affective polarization; there may, for instance, exist a link between violated election expectations and support for extreme post-election reactions. In October 2020, we asked a set of survey participants to complete positive and negative partisanship scales as well as their probabilistic assessments of the presidential candidates’ chances of winning. For both Democrats and Republicans we found a strong positive association between negative partisanship and the likelihood of winning assigned by voters to the presidential candidate of the same party. This indicates that there is a link between affective polarization and election expectations, and that negative partisanship may be the most important facet of that relationship.

Keywords: partisanship, election expectations, wishful thinking, anti-democratic practices

JEL Classification: D72, D83, D84, D91

Suggested Citation

Doiron, Maxim and Thomsson, Kaj and Tsakas, Elias and Vostroknutov, Alexander, Affective Polarization and Election Expectations (September 13, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4217761 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4217761

Maxim Doiron

Princeton University

Kaj Thomsson

Maastricht University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Elias Tsakas (Contact Author)

Maastricht University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Alexander Vostroknutov

Maastricht University ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.vostroknutov.com

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