Intermediation Frictions in Debt Relief: Evidence from CARES Act Forbearance

69 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2022

See all articles by You Suk Kim

You Suk Kim

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Donghoon Lee

Federal Reserve Bank of New York; New York University

Therese C. Scharlemann

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

James I. Vickery

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2022

Abstract

We study how intermediaries—mortgage servicers—shaped the implementation of mortgage forbearance during the COVID-19 pandemic and use servicer-level variation to trace out the causal effect of forbearance on borrowers. Forbearance provision varied widely across servicers. Small servicers and nonbanks, especially nonbanks with small liquidity buffers, facilitated fewer forbearances and saw a higher incidence of forbearance-related complaints. Easier access to forbearance substantially increased mortgage nonpayment but also reduced delinquencies outside of forbearance. Part of the liquidity from forbearance was used to reduce credit card debt, but most was saved or used for nondurable consumption.

Keywords: mortgage, forbearance, liquidity, nonbank, CARES Act, COVID-19

JEL Classification: G21, G23, G28

Suggested Citation

Kim, You Suk and Lee, Donghoon and Scharlemann, Therese C. and Vickery, James Ian, Intermediation Frictions in Debt Relief: Evidence from CARES Act Forbearance (October 2022). FRB of New York Staff Report No. 1035, 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4248290 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4248290

You Suk Kim

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

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Donghoon Lee (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

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New York University

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Therese C. Scharlemann

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

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United States

James Ian Vickery

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )

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Philadelphia, PA 19106
United States
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HOME PAGE: http://www.vickeryjames.com

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