Targeting Precision Medicine: Evidence from Prenatal Screening

71 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2022 Last revised: 20 Apr 2025

See all articles by Peter Conner

Peter Conner

Karolinska Institutet

Liran Einav

Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Amy Finkelstein

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Petra Persson

Stanford University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Heidi Williams

Stanford University

Date Written: November 2022

Abstract

Medical technologies can target care to patients identified through screening, raising questions of how broadly to screen for potential use. We explore this empirically in the context of a non-invasive prenatal screening, cfDNA, which is used to target a more costly invasive test that elevates miscarriage risk. Using Swedish administrative data on prenatal choices for pregnancies conceived between 2011 and 2019 – a period in which Swedish regions began providing coverage for the new screening – we document that coverage of cfDNA substantially increases cfDNA screening and reduces invasive testing. To assess the impact of counterfactual targeting of cfDNA coverage, we develop and estimate a stylized model of prenatal choices. We find that narrow targeting of cfDNA coverage can improve outcomes and reduce costs, while broader coverage also improves outcomes but with increased costs. These findings point to the potential gains from well-designed targeting of screening, but at the same time highlight the importance of the targeting design.

Suggested Citation

Conner, Peter and Einav, Liran and Finkelstein, Amy and Persson, Petra and Williams, Heidi, Targeting Precision Medicine: Evidence from Prenatal Screening (November 2022). NBER Working Paper No. w30669, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4282519

Peter Conner (Contact Author)

Karolinska Institutet ( email )

Granits väg 4
Section for Integrative Physiology
Solna, 17171
Sweden

Liran Einav

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
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Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-723-3704 (Phone)
928-223-4973 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Amy Finkelstein

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-588-0361 (Phone)
617-868-7242 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Petra Persson

Stanford University ( email )

367 Panama St
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Heidi Williams

Stanford University ( email )

367 Panama St
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

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