Nightless City: Impacts of Policymakers’ Questions on Overtime Work of Government Officials

ISER DP No. 1206

28 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2023

See all articles by Natsuki Arai

Natsuki Arai

Gettysburg College - Department of Economics

Masashige Hamano

Waseda University; University of Angers - Centre de Recherche en Epistémologie Appliquée (CREA); Universite du Luxembourg

Munechika Katayama

Waseda University - School of Political Science and Economics

Yuki Murakami

Waseda University

Katsunori Yamada

Kindai University - Faculty of Economics; Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

Date Written: March 21, 2023

Abstract

We quantify the impact of unexpectedly assigned tasks on overtime work in the context of Japanese government officials. Data on overtime work are typically less reliable. We overcome this problem by using mobile phone location data, which enables us to precisely measure the nighttime population in the government-office district in Tokyo at an hourly frequency. Exploiting the exogenous nature of task arrivals, we estimate impacts on overtime work. We find that, in response to a newly assigned task, overtime work initially decreases and then increases persistently. Institutional changes to relax the time constraint and improve the working environment of government officials play a part in mitigating overtime work, but persistent increases in overtime work remain. We provide a simple model of optimal work allocation and show that distortion in intertemporal task allocation can account for the observed responses.

Keywords: mobile location data, overtime work, local projection, government officials

JEL Classification: C22, H11, J22

Suggested Citation

Arai, Natsuki and Hamano, Masashige and Katayama, Munechika and Murakami, Yuki and Yamada, Katsunori, Nightless City: Impacts of Policymakers’ Questions on Overtime Work of Government Officials (March 21, 2023). ISER DP No. 1206, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4413072 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4413072

Natsuki Arai

Gettysburg College - Department of Economics ( email )

United States
7173376673 (Phone)

Masashige Hamano

Waseda University ( email )

1-104 Totsukamachi, Shinjuku-ku
tokyo, 169-8050
Japan

University of Angers - Centre de Recherche en Epistémologie Appliquée (CREA) ( email )

Ecole Polytechnique
1, rue Descartes
75005 Paris
France

Universite du Luxembourg ( email )

L-1511 Luxembourg
Luxembourg

Munechika Katayama (Contact Author)

Waseda University - School of Political Science and Economics ( email )

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Tokyo 169-8050
Japan

Yuki Murakami

Waseda University ( email )

Katsunori Yamada

Kindai University - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Higashi-Osaka City, Osaka 577-8502
Japan

HOME PAGE: http://www.eonet.ne.jp/~kyamada/

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )

6-1, Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan

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