Shareholder Proposals and the Debate over Sustainability Disclosure

U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 23-29

in Board-Shareholder Dialogue: Policy Debate, Legal Constraints and Best Practices (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming)

19 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2023

See all articles by Jill E. Fisch

Jill E. Fisch

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Adriana Robertson

University of Chicago Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: May 30, 2023

Abstract

The SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rule has generated substantial controversy. Among the concerns raised by commentators is that the rule is unnecessary because investors can obtain sufficient climate-related disclosure through private ordering.

We examine one mechanism for private ordering – the shareholder proposal rule. We empirically analyze shareholder proposals requesting environmental and social disclosures during the 2021 and 2022 proxy seasons. Contrary to some assertions, we find that investors submitted hundreds of these proposals, many of which received substantial levels of investor support. We further note the significant number of proposals that are settled and withdrawn, indicating that the issuer committed to providing the requested disclosure.

We conclude that there is substantial investor demand for greater sustainability disclosure. In modifying the mandatory disclosure regime, the SEC should look to shareholder proposals as a source of guidance and seek to complement these private ordering efforts.

Keywords: SEC rule, mandatory disclosure, private ordering, shareholders, investor support, corporate sustainability, capital markets, ESG, public companies, sustainability disclosure, EU regulatory mandates, climate-related disclosure, Rule 14a-8, shareholder proposals

JEL Classification: G18, G28, G23, G32, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Fisch, Jill E. and Robertson, Adriana, Shareholder Proposals and the Debate over Sustainability Disclosure (May 30, 2023). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 23-29 , in Board-Shareholder Dialogue: Policy Debate, Legal Constraints and Best Practices (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4477680

Jill E. Fisch (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-746-3454 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Adriana Robertson

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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