Direct Democracy Backsliding, 1950-2024

38 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2023 Last revised: 10 Jan 2025

See all articles by John G. Matsusaka

John G. Matsusaka

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; USC Gould School of Law

Date Written: January 02, 2025

Abstract

Direct democracy backsliding occurs when a government alters its laws to hinder the use of initiatives and referendums. This study develops a measure of direct democracy backsliding, collects the data to calculate it over the last 70 years, and documents several trends and patterns. The data reveal a continuous chipping away at direct democracy throughout the period; legislatures proposed 2.2 amendments restricting direct democracy every two-year electoral cycle on average, and four amendments restricting direct democracy for every one amendment expanding it. The amount of such activity in recent years is high but not at a peak for the period. The strongest predictor of anti-direct-democracy proposals is Republican control of the state legislature. There is not much evidence that legislators sought to restrict direct democracy for strategic reasons, either to forestall future adverse policy outcomes, or in reaction to past adverse outcomes. 

Keywords: Direct democracy, initiatives and references, democratic backsliding, institutions; institutional change

JEL Classification: H1, H7

Suggested Citation

Matsusaka, John G., Direct Democracy Backsliding, 1950-2024 (January 02, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4522377 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4522377

John G. Matsusaka (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

Department of Finance & Business Economics
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6495 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

USC Gould School of Law

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6495 (Phone)

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