Direct Democracy Backsliding? Quantifying the Prevalence and Investigating Causes 1960-2022

36 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2023 Last revised: 19 Oct 2023

See all articles by John G. Matsusaka

John G. Matsusaka

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; USC Gould School of Law

Date Written: October 17, 2023

Abstract

Direct democracy backsliding occurs when a state alters its laws to hinder the use of initiatives and referendums. This study quantifies the prevalence of direct democracy backsliding over the period 1960-2022, and investigates its causes. I find a continuous chipping away at direct democracy throughout the period; legislatures proposed 2.3 amendments restricting direct democracy every two-year electoral cycle on average, and there were four amendments restricting direct democracy for every one expanding it. Contrary to media speculation, the amount of such activity is not unusually high recently. Using time series and cross-sectional variation with state and year fixed effects, I identify two factors that triggered anti-direct democracy proposals: Republican control of the state legislature, and successful initiatives and referendums. I develop a theoretical framework to characterize the motives for direct democratic backsliding, and provide evidence suggesting that strategic considerations – restricting direct democracy to induce favored policy outcomes – may not be the whole story; legislators also may have philosophical preferences over processes, specifically opposition to the idea of citizen lawmaking in principle. Anti-direct-democracy efforts were largely driven by elites – ordinary voters did not appear to share the negative orientation of their elected representatives.

Keywords: Direct democracy, initiatives and references, backsliding, state legislatures

JEL Classification: H1, H7

Suggested Citation

Matsusaka, John G., Direct Democracy Backsliding? Quantifying the Prevalence and Investigating Causes 1960-2022 (October 17, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4522377 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4522377

John G. Matsusaka (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

Department of Finance & Business Economics
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6495 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

USC Gould School of Law

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6495 (Phone)

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