Mega Grants: Why Would a Board Approve Nine-Figure CEO Pay?

9 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2023

See all articles by David F. Larcker

David F. Larcker

Stanford Graduate School of Business; Stanford University - Hoover Institution; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Date Written: August 1, 2023

Abstract

Recent years have seen a reemergence of the practice of awarding “mega grants” to CEOs. Mega grants are large, one-time equity awards granted in lieu of or in addition to annual awards with the intended purpose of providing significant incentive to the CEO to achieve long-term targets. The practice of awarding mega grants is controversial because of their size. In this Closer Look, we examine the types of awards granted, the circumstances of their grant, and shareholder reaction.

We ask:

• Why would a board draw attention and controversy to itself by awarding a mega grant to its CEO?
• What added incentive does a CEO receive from a one-time, large award instead of multiple annual awards over time?
• Who actually initiates a discussion about a potential mega grant: the CEO or the board?
• What are the implications for the firm and its shareholders if targets are missed and the CEO perceives no chance of receiving a payout from the grant?

Keywords: Corporate governance, CEO compensation, equity awards, equity compensation, mega grants, stock options, Elon Musk, board of directors, proxy advisory firms, corporate governance research

Suggested Citation

Larcker, David F. and Tayan, Brian, Mega Grants: Why Would a Board Approve Nine-Figure CEO Pay? (August 1, 2023). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4523019

David F. Larcker (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-725-6159 (Phone)

Stanford University - Hoover Institution ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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