The Effective Use of Economics in the EU Digital Markets Act

Yale Tobin Center for Economic Policy Discussion Paper No. 8

25 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2023

See all articles by Alexandre de Streel

Alexandre de Streel

University of Namur; Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)

Jacques Crémer

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Paul Heidhues

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf

Amelia Fletcher

Centre for Competition Policy and Norwich Business School, UEA

Gene Kimmelman

Public Knowledge

Giorgio Monti

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Rupprecht Podszun

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Faculty of Law

Monika Schnitzer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)

Fiona M. Scott Morton

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: July 30, 2023

Abstract

Economic thinking and analysis lie at the heart of the objectives and the design of the EU Digital Markets Act. However, the design of the DMA reflects a very deliberate—and reasonable—intention to ensure clarity, speed, administrability, and enforceability. In doing so, this pro-competitive regulation omits several elements of standard competition law where economics has typically played a key role. Nonetheless, we believe that economic insights and analysis—including behavioural economic thinking—will continue to play an important role in enabling the DMA to achieve its ambitious and laudable goals, albeit in a somewhat different way

Keywords: Regulation, Antitrust, Digital Platforms, Digital Markets Act, Economics

JEL Classification: K21, K23, L41, L51, L86

Suggested Citation

de Streel, Alexandre and Crémer, Jacques and Heidhues, Paul and Fletcher, Amelia and Kimmelman, Gene and Monti, Giorgio and Podszun, Rupprecht and Schnitzer, Monika and Scott Morton, Fiona M., The Effective Use of Economics in the EU Digital Markets Act (July 30, 2023). Yale Tobin Center for Economic Policy Discussion Paper No. 8 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4526050 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4526050

Alexandre De Streel

University of Namur ( email )

8 rempart de la vierge
Namur, 5000
Belgium

Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) ( email )

Av Louise 475/10
Brussels, 1050
Belgium

Jacques Crémer

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

Paul Heidhues

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 1
Duesseldorf, DE NRW 40225
Germany

Amelia Fletcher (Contact Author)

Centre for Competition Policy and Norwich Business School, UEA ( email )

Norwich
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://people.uea.ac.uk/amelia_fletcher

Gene Kimmelman

Public Knowledge ( email )

1818 N Street, NW
Suite 410
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Giorgio Monti

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/staff/g-monti

Rupprecht Podszun

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Faculty of Law

Universitätsstr. 1
Düsseldorf, D-40225
Germany

Monika Schnitzer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

Fiona M. Scott Morton

Yale School of Management ( email )

493 College St
New Haven, CT CT 06520
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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