Network Structure and Auditor Compensation: Evidence from a Small World Bipartite Network

39 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2023

See all articles by D. James Zhang

D. James Zhang

University of Galway - J.E. Cairnes School of Business & Economics

Reggy Hooghiemstra

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business

Floor Rink

University of Groningen

Dennis Veltrop

University of Groningen

Date Written: August 17, 2023

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between auditors’ tacit knowledge transfer and auditor compensation. We exploit a unique proprietary sample and employ small-world theory in social network analysis to capture tacit knowledge transfer among individual auditors. Drawing from an audit firm’s full year of personnel records and data on the assignment of individual auditors to audit engagements throughout the year, we find a statistically significant positive association between tacit knowledge transfer and auditor compensation. Furthermore, we find that this positive association is mainly driven by assistants, audit seniors, and audit managers. Finally, we find that auditor performance is likely to be a valid mechanism linking tacit knowledge transfer and auditor compensation for audit seniors and audit managers. Overall, our results suggest that the social capital embedded within knowledge networks plays an important role in auditor compensation.

Keywords: Auditor Compensation; Tacit Knowledge Transfer; Small World Network; Auditor Performance; Social Network Analysis

JEL Classification: M42, M41, D83, J31

Suggested Citation

Zhang, James and Hooghiemstra, Reggy and Rink, Floor and Veltrop, Dennis, Network Structure and Auditor Compensation: Evidence from a Small World Bipartite Network (August 17, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4543919 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4543919

James Zhang (Contact Author)

University of Galway - J.E. Cairnes School of Business & Economics ( email )

Galway
Ireland

Reggy Hooghiemstra

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business ( email )

Department of Auditing
P.O. Box 800
9700 AH Groningen
Netherlands
31 50 363 3768 (Phone)
31 50 363 7174 (Fax)

Floor Rink

University of Groningen ( email )

P.O. Box 800
9700 AH Groningen, Groningen 9700 AV
Netherlands

Dennis Veltrop

University of Groningen

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