Prosecutorial Discretion: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

29 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2023

See all articles by Stanton Hudja

Stanton Hudja

University of Toronto, Department of Economics, Students

Jason Anthony Aimone

Baylor University - Department of Economics

Charles M. North

Baylor University Department of Economics

Jason Ralston

Whitman College

Lucas Rentschler

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: September 17, 2023

Abstract

How does restricting prosecutorial discretion affect the criminal justice system? Many legal scholars have suggested that setting a minimum plea bargain can reduce the innocence problem (i.e., reduce the number of false convictions in the criminal justice system). We develop a novel model of the criminal justice system to address this suggestion. We show theoretically that setting a minimum plea bargain can both reduce the innocence problem and (slightly) reduce crime rates. We implement this model in a laboratory experiment and find that restricting prosecutorial discretion reduces the innocence problem, but has no effect on crime rates. Additionally, we find an unintended consequence of restricting prosecutorial discretion: we find a significant decrease in the rate at which guilty individuals accept plea bargains.

Keywords: Prosecutorial Discretion, Criminal Justice

JEL Classification: C70, C90

Suggested Citation

Hudja, Stanton and Aimone, Jason Anthony and North, Charles M. and Ralston, Jason and Rentschler, Lucas, Prosecutorial Discretion: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation (September 17, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4574439 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4574439

Stanton Hudja (Contact Author)

University of Toronto, Department of Economics, Students ( email )

150 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario
Canada

Jason Anthony Aimone

Baylor University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 98003
Waco, TX 76798-8003
United States

Charles M. North

Baylor University Department of Economics ( email )

One Bear Place # 98003
Waco, TX 76798-8003
United States

Jason Ralston

Whitman College ( email )

P.O. Box 98003
Walla Walla, WA 99362
United States

Lucas Rentschler

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Logan, UT 84322-1400
United States

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