Self-signalling behaviour and donation causes among Muslim Donors: Evidence from the Field.

45 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2023

See all articles by Yasmin Doghri

Yasmin Doghri

Sapienza University of Rome - Department of Economics and Law; University of Milan - University of Milan

Date Written: December 12, 2023

Abstract

This study proposes preliminary experimental insights into Muslim donor behaviour in a Western context. In opposition to standard models of indirect reciprocity, previous research shows Muslim donor preferences towards private and out-group causes rather than public and in-group ones. We conducted a field experiment in six Italian Muslim cultural centres to further explore whether the purpose of donation leads to self-signalling donations. To do so, we introduce an innovative collection method that we name semi-public, where donations are anonymous to all fellow community members except for organizers and the local leader. In line with previous field studies, we find a strong preference for private donations with intensive margins higher towards out-group rather than in-group causes. Yet, when the donation setting is semi-public, overall donations are higher compared to those collected in private settings. This result is regardless of donors’ compliance, i.e., whether they actually signalled their donations in the semi-public setting. Not only donations are predominantly private in the semi-public setting, but donations are signalled almost exclusively when contributions benefit the local community, i.e., they are in-group rather than out-group oriented.

Keywords: Donations, Signalling-effect, In-group favouritism, Field experiment, Muslim, Italy.

JEL Classification: D03, D64, D71, Z12

Suggested Citation

Doghri, Yasmin, Self-signalling behaviour and donation causes among Muslim Donors: Evidence from the Field. (December 12, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4662386 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4662386

Yasmin Doghri (Contact Author)

Sapienza University of Rome - Department of Economics and Law ( email )

via Castro del Laurenziano 9
Roma, IA Rome 00191
Italy

University of Milan - University of Milan ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono 7
Milan

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