Priced-Out: Rent Control, Wages, and Inequality

61 Pages Posted: 30 Dec 2024 Last revised: 30 Dec 2024

See all articles by Geraldo Cerqueiro

Geraldo Cerqueiro

Catolica-Lisbon SBE

Isaac Hacamo

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Pedro S. Raposo

Universidade Católica Portuguesa

Derek Wenning

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Date Written: March 09, 2024

Abstract

We show that after a quasi-exogenous loss of rent control in Portugal, low-income workers’ earnings decline significantly. High-income workers are unaffected, despite both being equally likely to migrate outside the city. We further show that the wage decline stems from transitions to lower-quality jobs outside the city, which we connect to relatively high commuting costs for low-income workers. In particular, the negative impact on wages is driven by individuals who do not own a personal vehicle and rely on public transit for commuting. We explore alternative policies through the lens of a quantitative commuting model with rent control. Our counterfactual analysis examines housing voucher policies, including a recent policy introduced by the Portuguese government. Relative to rent control, housing vouchers reduce taxation on landlords and reduce regional inequality among low-income workers, but only replicate low-income workers’ welfare gains if they do not impose implicit mobility restrictions.

Keywords: Rent control, wages, inequality, labor markets, housing affordability, public transportation, migration

JEL Classification: J21, J22, J24, J31, J61, R23, R31, R41, R48

Suggested Citation

Cerqueiro, Geraldo and Hacamo, Isaac and Raposo, Pedro S. and Wenning, Derek, Priced-Out: Rent Control, Wages, and Inequality (March 09, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4753471 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4753471

Geraldo Cerqueiro

Catolica-Lisbon SBE ( email )

Palma de Cima
Lisbon, 1649-023
Portugal

Isaac Hacamo (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )

1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-7842 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://hacamo.weebly.com/

Pedro S. Raposo

Universidade Católica Portuguesa ( email )

Lisbon
Portugal

Derek Wenning

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )

1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.derekwenning.com

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