State-market entanglement: some implications for the theory of public finance

36 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2024 Last revised: 25 Mar 2024

See all articles by Zachary Kessler

Zachary Kessler

The Alan Turing Institute

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: March 22, 2024

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the way economists conceptualize the relationship between state and market within their theories of public finance. It is customary for them to treat polity and economy as comprising separate domains of human activity. In contrast, the recently developing notion of entangled political economy treats the state-market dichotomy as an abstraction wherein political and economic organizations are deeply entangled with one another. While property and its distinction between mine and thine is a universal quality of the human species [Wilson 2020], specific and particular rights of property are always contestable through entanglement among political and commercial entities. Entanglement calls attention to the processes through which rights of action are established and challenged within an entangled system of political economy. What results from our exploration into entanglement and public finance is recognition of the high analytical potential of reviving Antonio de Viti’s [1888, 1936] initial interest in transforming the focus of public finance from the practice of public finance into a scientific theory, thereby joining public finance and public choice to form political economy.

Keywords: property rights; entangled political economy; human nature; perpetual contestation; Antonio de Viti de Marco; James M. Buchanan

JEL Classification: B41, D70, P14, P16, P48

Suggested Citation

Kessler, Zachary and Wagner, Richard E., State-market entanglement: some implications for the theory of public finance (March 22, 2024). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 24-07, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4769630 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4769630

Zachary Kessler

The Alan Turing Institute ( email )

British Library, 96 Euston Road
96 Euston Road
London, NW12DB
United Kingdom

Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
334 Enterprise Hall
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
(703) 993-1132 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rwagner/

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/richard-wagner

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
40
Abstract Views
271
PlumX Metrics