Financial Repression in General Equilibrium: The Case of the United States, 1948–1974

54 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2024

See all articles by Martin Kliem

Martin Kliem

Deutsche Bundesbank - Research Centre

Alexander Kriwoluzky

University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics

Gernot J. Müller

University of Tübingen - Department of Economics

Alexander Scheer

Deutsche Bundesbank

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2024

Abstract

Financial repression lowers the return on government debt and contributes, all else equal, towards its liquidation. However, its full effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio hinges on how repression impacts the economy at large because it alters investment and saving decisions. We develop and estimate a New Keynesian model with financial repression. Based on U.S. data for the period 1948–1974, we find, consistent with earlier work, that repression was pervasive but gradually phased out. A model-based counterfactual shows that GDP would have been 5 percent lower, and the debt-to-GDP ratio 20 percentage points higher, had repression not been phased out.

Keywords: Financial repression, Government debt, Interest rates, Banks, Regulation, Bayesian estimation

JEL Classification: H63,E43,G28

Suggested Citation

Kliem, Martin and Kriwoluzky, Alexander and Müller, Gernot J. and Scheer, Alexander, Financial Repression in General Equilibrium: The Case of the United States, 1948–1974 (March 2024). DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 2075, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4785283 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4785283

Martin Kliem

Deutsche Bundesbank - Research Centre ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
D-60431 Frankfurt/Main
Germany

Alexander Kriwoluzky (Contact Author)

University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics ( email )

Postfach 2220
D-53012 Bonn
Germany

Gernot J. Müller

University of Tübingen - Department of Economics ( email )

Mohlstrasse 36
D-72074 Tuebingen, 72074
Germany

Alexander Scheer

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
59
Abstract Views
368
Rank
649,089
PlumX Metrics