The Attention Economy of Crowdfunding: Investor Attention and Decisions

49 Pages Posted: 1 May 2024

See all articles by Lin Hu

Lin Hu

Australian National University (ANU)

Kun Li

Australian National University (ANU)

Zhenhua Wu

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department

Bin Gu

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Date Written: May 1, 2024

Abstract

Crowdfunding has become a popular way for entrepreneurs to seek investments as it bypasses traditional financial intermediaries to provide entrepreneurs direct access to retailer investors. Disintermediation, however, could exacerbate information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and retail investors and require significant attention from retail investors to acquire and digest project information. As attention has increasingly become a scarce resource, the goal of this paper is to study how changes to investor's attention costs affect their investment behavior and subsequently crowdfunding performance. We use a multi-method approach to study the question. We first develop an analytical model wherein retail investors with attention costs strategically acquire project information before making investment decisions. We then conduct comparative static analyses on how changes to investors' attention costs affect their information acquisition, investment decisions, and crowdfunding performance. We finally exploit a novel measure associated with attention costs of retail investors--news pressure--to empirically evaluate the predictions of the analytical model. The results support our model predictions: The rise of investor attention costs may paradoxically improve the performance of a crowdfunding project if average investors hold favorable preferences for the project.

Keywords: Crowdfunding; Attention Economy; News Pressure

Suggested Citation

Hu, Lin and Li, Kun and Wu, Zhenhua and Gu, Bin, The Attention Economy of Crowdfunding: Investor Attention and Decisions (May 1, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4813261 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4813261

Lin Hu

Australian National University (ANU) ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

Kun Li

Australian National University (ANU) ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

Zhenhua Wu (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287-3806
United States

Bin Gu

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

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