The Economics of Data Privacy and Big Tech Regulation

46 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2024

See all articles by Ke Rong

Ke Rong

Institute of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University

Fei Hao

Institute of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University

Feng Zhu

Harvard University - Harvard Business School

Date Written: June 20, 2024

Abstract

The implementation of privacy legislation in various countries is designed to protect data and privacy. However, empirical evidence substantiating the positive impacts of data privacy regulation remains scarce. This study examines the Chinese “Double Lists” policy, treated as a natural experiment, and utilizes a Difference-in-Differences (DID) methodology to assess the policy's effects on application (app) performance. The findings reveal a notable increase in app installations attributable to privacy regulation. The results suggest that privacy regulation can enhance app installations by improving user perception, particularly user perception of information security, and fostering innovation. In conclusion, privacy regulation, exemplified by the “Double Lists” policy, offers significant advantages to big firms. From a market competition perspective, privacy regulation may enhance the appeal of big tech companies to new users.

Keywords: privacy regulation, app installations, innovation, big tech, market competition

Suggested Citation

Rong, Ke and Hao, Fei and Zhu, Feng, The Economics of Data Privacy and Big Tech Regulation (June 20, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4871499 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4871499

Ke Rong

Institute of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University ( email )

MingZhai Building
Beijing, 100084
China

Fei Hao (Contact Author)

Institute of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University

Beijing, 100084
China

Feng Zhu

Harvard University - Harvard Business School ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 431
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/profile.aspx?facId=14938

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