Motivated Reasoning in the Social Domain

115 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2024 Last revised: 24 Feb 2025

See all articles by Peiran Jiao

Peiran Jiao

Maastricht University - Department of Finance

Jing Li

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics - Laboratory of Experimental Economics

Xinxin Zhu

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics; Maastricht University

Jichuan Zong

School of Finance and Laboratory of Experimental Economics

Date Written: February 24, 2025

Abstract

Individuals engage in motivated reasoning to maintain a positive self-image in ego-relevant domains. This paper experimentally tests motivated reasoning regarding one's altruism in the forms of both asymmetric updating and selective recall, as well as their dynamics. We, for the first time, demonstrate the robustness of the optimistic updating bias in the domain of social behavior. More interestingly, the optimistic updating was more severe when participants updated beliefs about themselves being relatively less selfish than about being more altruistic. Further, we document evidence consistent with the belief-based utility foundation of the optimistic belief updating. We replicate and extend earlier findings about selective recall, and demonstrate a linkage between the recall and belief patterns. These results could inform theories of motivated reasoning, and generate implications for both self-image maintenance and social interactions.

Keywords: Asymmetric Updating, Selective Recall, Dictator Game, Altruism, Laboratory Experiment JEL Codes: C91

JEL Classification: C91, D64, D83, D84, D91

Suggested Citation

Jiao, Peiran and Li, Jing and Zhu, Xinxin and Zong, Jichuan, Motivated Reasoning in the Social Domain (February 24, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4886632 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4886632

Peiran Jiao (Contact Author)

Maastricht University - Department of Finance ( email )

Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Jing Li

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics - Laboratory of Experimental Economics ( email )

Liaoning
China

Xinxin Zhu

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics ( email )

Dalian
China

Maastricht University ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, Limburg 6200MD
Netherlands

Jichuan Zong

School of Finance and Laboratory of Experimental Economics ( email )

217 Jianshan St,
Shahekou
Dalian, Liaoning
China

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