The effect of bond ownership structure on ESG performance

56 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2024 Last revised: 23 Oct 2024

See all articles by Ke Yang

Ke Yang

Lehigh University

Hye Seung (Grace) Lee

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business

Jesus M. Salas

Lehigh University - Department of Finance and Law

Ke Shen

Lehigh University -- Perella Department of Finance

Date Written: June 30, 2023

Abstract

We examine whether firms’ ESG performance is influenced by bondholder preferences. We argue that insurance companies have unique incentives to monitor bond issuers’ ESG performance because insurers face enhanced exposures to ESG shocks in their balance sheets and trading operations. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with higher bond ownership by insurance companies are associated with higher future ESG ratings. To address potential identification concerns, we test changes in bond issuers’ ESG ratings following the initial bond investment by insurance companies. We find that firms’ ESG performance improves after insurance companies’ initial bond investment. We also find that this improvement in ESG performance is concentrated in firms with greater reliance on bond financing and investment capital from insurance companies. Our study underscores the importance of bond ownership structure in influencing corporate ESG performance.

Keywords: JEL Classification: G2, G11, G32 Corporate social responsibility, ESG, Bond ownership, Insurance companies, Credit ratings

Suggested Citation

Yang, Ke and Lee, Hye Seung (Grace) and Salas, Jesus M. and Shen, Ke, The effect of bond ownership structure on ESG performance (June 30, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4891881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4891881

Ke Yang (Contact Author)

Lehigh University ( email )

621 Taylor Street
Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States
6107583684 (Phone)
6107586429 (Fax)

Hye Seung (Grace) Lee

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business ( email )

140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Jesus M. Salas

Lehigh University - Department of Finance and Law ( email )

Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States
610-758-3238 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www3.lehigh.edu/business/faculty/salas.asp

Ke Shen

Lehigh University -- Perella Department of Finance ( email )

621 Taylor St
Rauch Business Center
Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States
(610) 758-1084 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/ke-shen-finance

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