Freedom of Speech and Employee Disclosure

40 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2024

See all articles by Jens Böke

Jens Böke

University of Münster

Brigham Brau

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School

Stephen Glaeser

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Junyoung Jeong

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area

Date Written: July 24, 2024

Abstract

We examine how freedom of speech protections affect employee disclosure. To identify the effect of freedom of speech protections, we use anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) laws, which punish lawsuits that censor, intimidate, or silence critics. We examine the effect of anti-SLAPP laws using a within firm-year design that compares employee disclosures for employees working at the same firm at the same point in time. We find that employees protected by anti-SLAPP laws write more negative reviews and leave lower ratings on Glassdoor.com, a prominent employee disclosure platform. These negative reviews are more likely to discuss issues with discrimination, ethics and fraud, safety, and management. Consistent with these negative reviews credibly revealing underlying issues, anti-SLAPP laws intensify the relation between safety and fraud violations and employee disclosure of these same issues. Lastly, we find that anti-SLAPP laws increase the time to fill new jobs, consistent with protected employees' negative reviews discouraging job seekers. The results highlight how free speech protections shape employee disclosure.

Keywords: Employee disclosure, labor markets, social media, freedom of speech JEL classification: E24, G34, G41, M41

JEL Classification: E24, G34, G41, M41

Suggested Citation

Böke, Jens and Brau, Brigham and Glaeser, Stephen and Jeong, Junyoung, Freedom of Speech and Employee Disclosure (July 24, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4904664

Jens Böke

University of Münster ( email )

Universitätsstraße 14-16
Münster, 48143
Germany

Brigham Brau

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

Stephen Glaeser (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

Junyoung Jeong

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

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